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OPINION
                                     
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Hi Tech Trans, LLC, which
operates a solid waste disposal facility in
Newark, New Jersey, and its Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, David Stoller
(hereinafter collectively referred to as  “Hi
     *Honorable Berle M. Schiller, U.S.
District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2Tech”), sought declaratory relief against an
administrative enforcement proceeding the
New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (“NJDEP”) brought against Hi
Tech. Hi Tech claimed that certain permit
and license requirements imposed on solid
waste disposal facilities by the New Jersey
Solid Waste Management Act (“SWMA”),
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-1 to -207, and its
implementing regulations1 are preempted
because its solid waste disposal facility
involves transportation by railroad and is
therefore subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation
Board (“STB”).2   The district court did
not directly address the merits of Hi
Tech’s preemption argument. Rather, the
court invoked the doctrine of abstention
under both Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943), and Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), and dismissed the
complaint.   Hi Tech now appeals the
dismissal of its declaratory action.
Although our analysis differs from the
analysis the district court relied upon, for
the reasons the follow, we will affirm.3
I.  BACKGROUND
A.  New Jersey’s  Regulatory  Scheme
New Jersey has established a
comprehensive statutory scheme for
regulating solid waste disposal based upon
a legislative determination that “disposal
and utilization of solid waste is a matter of
grave concern . . . and . . .that the health,
safety and welfare of the people of [New
Jersey] require efficient and reasonable
solid waste collection and disposal service
or efficient utilization of such waste.”
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-2(a).  
The collection, transportation,
transfer, processing and disposal of solid
waste is regulated by the SWMA  and
corresponding regulations located at
N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.1 et seq.  The SWMA
grants the NJDEP the authority to regulate
all solid waste facilities and register all
persons engaged in the collection or
disposal of solid waste.  N.J.S.A. 13:1E-
2(b)(6),  N.J.S.A. 13:1E-4(a).  In its
regulatory capacity, NJDEP can impose
liability on any “person” who violates the
SWMA or the solid waste regulations.
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9(b).  Regulations define a
“person” to includ e indiv iduals ,
corporations and corporate officials.
N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.4. “Solid Waste” is
defined broadly to include waste material
that is stored or deposited in a manner that
“such material or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted
into the air or discharged into ground or
     1 See N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.1 et seq.
     2As we will discuss below, the STB is
the federal agency having exclusive
jurisdiction over rail transportation.
Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail,
Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, 252
F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).
     3 We may affirm for any reason
supported by the record, even if the
grounds we rely upon differ from the
grounds the district court relied upon.
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d
Cir. 2000). 
3surface waters.”  N.J.A.C.  7:26-1.6©),
N.J.A.C. 7-26-2.13(g)(1)(iii).   Hi Tech’s
OIRY facility is a “Solid waste facility”
under the SWMA.5  It also constitutes a
“transfer station” under the SWMA.6 
New Jersey’s environmental
regulatory scheme prohibits “construction
or operation of a solid waste facility
without first obtaining a Solid Waste
Facility (“SWF”)  Permit unless exempted
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.1, -1.7 or -
1.8.”7  In addition to requiring a SWF,
New Jersey law states that no “person”
may operate a solid waste disposal facility.
. . without first obtaining a certificate of
public convenience and necessity. N.J.S.A.
48:13A-6.8   A person operating a solid
waste facility in violation of that
requirement is subject to fines ranging
from $10,000 for a first offense, to not
more than $50,000 for a third or
subsequent offense. N.J.S.A. 48:13A-
12(b). 
B. Hi Tech’s Business
     5The statute defines a “solid waste
facility” to include any site or building
used for the “storage, collection,
processing, transfer, transportation,
separation, recycling, recovering or
disposal” of solid waste material.  N.J.A.C.
7-26-1.4.
     6   A “transfer station” is defined as “a
solid waste facility at which solid waste is
transferred from one solid waste vehicle to
another solid waste vehicle, including a
rail car, for transportation to an off-site
solid waste facility, or a solid waste
facility at which [certain kinds of] liquid
waste (as defined at N.J.A.C. 7:26-2.13(h))
is received, stored, treated or transferred[].
. . . ” N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.4.
     7 A “[s]olid waste facility permit” or a
“SWF permit” is “a certificate of approved
registration and engineering design
approval for a nonhazardous solid waste
facility.  N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.4   The minimum
mandatory penalty for operating a solid
waste facility without a permit is $5,000,
N.J.A.C. 7:26-5.4(g)(2), and each day a
violation continues constitutes a separate
and distinct offense. N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9(e).
     8 N.J.S.A. 48:13A-6 provides in
pertinent part:
No person shall engage, or be permitted to
engage, in the business of solid waste
collection or solid waste disposal unless
found . . . to be qualified by experience,
training or education to engage in such
business, is able to furnish proof of
financial responsibility, and unless that
person holds a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. . . .
In order to obtain that certificate, an
applicant must disclose the names and
addresses of all persons with a legal or
beneficial interest in the applicant’s
business.  N.J.A.C. 7:26H-1.8(a)(1).  The
applicant must also give appropriate
information regarding his/her skill,
experience or education and financial
responsibility.  N.J.A.C. 7-26H-1.8(a)(2)
4Hi Tech’s principal  place of
business is located at the Oak Island Rail
Yard (“OIRY”), in Newark, New Jersey.
David Stoller is Chairman and CEO of Hi
Tech.  In 1990, the Canadian Pacific
Limited, now known as the Canadian
Pacific Railroad  (“CPR”), purchased the
assets and “trackage rights” of the former
Delaware and Hudson Railway Company.9
Those assets included trackage rights into
the OIRY.  
On November 6, 2000, CPR and Hi
Tech entered into a License Agreement
whereby Hi Tech agreed to develop and
operate a construction and demolition
debris (“C&D”) bulk waste loading facility
at the OIRY.10  Paragraph 4(a) of the
License Agreement limits Hi Tech to using
“the Premises only for the transfer of
Waste Products from truck to railcars
operated by CPR.”  
Hi Tech began operations at the
facility (which it refers to as the
“Transload Facility”), on September 17,
2001.  Hi Tech’s Transload Facility
operates as follows: (1) trucks hauling
C&D waste arrive at the facility; (2) the
trucks discharge C&D into a hopper that
Hi Tech provides at the facility; and (3) the
C&D waste is then loaded directly into rail
cars from the hoppers.  C&D waste is
neither stored nor processed at the facility.
Once the rail cars have been filled, CPR
transports them exclusively to out-of-state
disposal facilities. 
C. The NJDEP Investigation at OIRY
On April 16, 2003, NJDEP
investigators conducted a site visit at the
Hi Tech facility at OIRY.   While there,
they saw solid waste origin/disposal
     9 “Trackage rights agreements are
arrangements by which one railroad
company allows another to use its railroad
tracks.   These agreements can take one of
two different forms.   The owner railroad
may allow the tenant railroad to serve
freight customers along the leased track or
may limit the tenant railroad to use of the
track from one point to another,
withholding permission to serve customers
along the route.” Illinois Commerce
Comm. v Interstate Commerce Comm.,
819 F. 2d 311, 313 (D.C. Cir., 1987).  
     10The Agreement provided in relevant
part that:
CPR desires to utilize a
portion of the Railyard . . .
for the transloading of non-
hazardous construction and
demolition debris (“C&D”)
a n d  n o n - h a z a r d o u s
contaminated soils (“Soils”),
and intermodal transloading
of containerized sludges and
solid waste (“Containerized
Waste”) (C&D, Soils and
Containerized Waste are
herein after collectively
referred to as “Waste
Products”) . . . .
5(“O&D”) forms11 and weigh tickets taken
in and generated for solid waste loads
accepted that day.  All loads were
classified on the O&D forms as either ID
# 13 or ID #13C.  See note 11.  
R e c o r d s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t
approximately 12 “roll-off vehicles” had
delivered  solid waste to the facility for
transfer from Hi Tech’s facility prior to the
NJDEP’s investigators’ arrival on April
16, 2003.
Before Joseph Levy, Hi Tech’s
general manager, arrived at the facility, the
investigators also observed 4 loaded
gondola rail cars containing bulky waste
materials such as plaster, lathe, treated
painted wood, plastic bags, cardboard,
drywall, and sheet metal.  The
investigators met with Levy and asked him
to accompany them to observe the actual
“tipping operation” and to answer
questions regarding the operation.   
Inbound roll-off trucks transporting
C&D (ID #13C) and bulky waste (ID #13)
were thereafter observed entering the
facility and proceeding to the inbound
scale.  The trucks went to the “east box”12
to dump their loads of solid waste and
thereafter a crane loaded the waste into a
waiting open-top rail car.  Loads were
visually inspected prior to dumping, and
the crane operator had a full view of what
was being dumped out of the roll-off
container. 
After dumping and leaving the “east
box” area, trucks crossed the railroad
tracks and proceeded to “weigh out” at the
outbound scale.  There, drivers turned in
O&D forms and signed off on scale tickets
     11 Solid waste facilities are required to
maintain waste origin/disposal records for
each load of waste received by waste type
ID number.  N.J.A.C. 7:26-2.13(g).  “Type
13" is “Bulky waste: Large items of waste
material, such as appliances and furniture.”
N.J.A.C. 7:26-2.13(g)(iii).  “Type 13C” is
“Construction and demolition waste:
Waste building material and rubble
resulting from construction, remodeling,
repair, and demolition operations on
houses, commercial buildings, pavements,
and other structures.”  N.J.A.C. 7:26-
2.13(g)(iv).  
     12The “east box” refers to a roofless
dumping area with approximately 12' high
metal sides observed to be active during
the inspection.  The “west box” is a
dumping area which was not active during
the inspect ion , a lthough  NJDEP
investigators observed and photographed
several cubic yards of demolition waste
present in the west box.  Both dumping
areas are similarly constructed with an
earthen/C&D ramp on which the grappler
operates to load the deposited waste into
adjacent gondola rail cars.  Likewise, each
dumping area has 1" steel plate bottom
area onto which waste is deposited.  A
steel frame ramp with wooden slats was
observed constructed at each dumping area
to accommodate roll off trucks.  A lower
dumping area (at ground level) was
observed at each dumping area to
accommodate larger transfer trailers and
the overflow traffic of roll off vehicles.  
6prior to leaving the site. During the several
minutes that investigators observed this
operation, they saw several roll-off
containers from various commercial and
non-commercial solid waste haulers dump
loads into the east box before the crane
loaded that waste into a waiting rail car.
They also saw approximately 15 loads
(approximately 375 cubic yards)  of ID
#13 or ID #13D solid waste tipped for
transfer at the facility.
Based upon this investigation, the
NJDEP determined that Hi Tech was
operating a transfer station, and that OIRY
was a “solid waste facility.” As noted
above, solid waste facilities require solid
waste facility permits and NJDEP approval
of engineering designs.  Based upon
observations during the site visit, the
NJDEP issued an Administrative Order
after determining that Hi Tech was
operating the facility without the required
permits, registration, or design approvals
and that Hi Tech was therefore operating
the facility in violation of N.J.A.C. 7:26-
2.8(f).  The Administrative Order also
charged that Hi Tech was operating in
violation of N.J.A.C. 7:26H-1.6(a) because
it was engaging in the business of solid
waste disposal without a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity.13 No
penalty was assessed, but Hi Tech and
Stoller were ordered to cease solid waste
operations within twenty days.
The Order was served upon Hi
Tech and Stoller on May 28, 2003, with an
effective date of June 17, 2003.  As will be
detailed later, Hi Tech and Stoller filed a
complaint in the district court on June 6,
2003, seeking, a declaration that state
regulation of the OIRY facility was
preempted by federal law. However, as of
June 16, 2003, the day the district court
dismissed the complaint, Hi Tech and
Stoller had not availed themselves of their
right to request either an administrative
hearing, a stay from the NJDEP, or any of
the other relief afforded under New
Jersey’s Administrative Procedure Act.14
     13 The Administrative Order also
determined that David Stoller, as
Chairman and CEO of Hi Tech, had actual
responsibility for the operation of the
illegal solid waste facility and could have
prevented the violation but failed to do so.
Accordingly, the Administrative Order
stated that Stoller was in violation of
N.J.A.C. 7:26-2.8(f) (failure to obtain a
SWF permit prior to constructing or
operating a solid waste facility); and
N.J.A.C. 7:26H-1.6(a) (failure to obtain a
Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity prior to engaging in the business
of solid waste disposal).  
     14New Jersey’s Administrative
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1, sets
forth the procedures to be followed in the
initial adjud icatory phase of an
administrative procedure wherein the
NJDEP will exercise its quasi-judicial
function to determine the allegations set
forth in the administrative cease and desist
order.  A party may take an appeal as of
right to the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, for review of final
7Instead, they waited until June 17, 2003,
the day after the district court dismissed
the complaint in this case,  and then sought
a hearing and stay from the NJDEP. 
On June 30, 2003, Bradley
Campbell, New Jersey’s Commissioner of
Environmental Protection, ordered “that
the Office of Solid Waste Compliance and
Enforcement shall forbear from seeking
judicial enforcement of the cease and
desist order for a period of 60 days, or
until further order of the Department
vacating or amending this order for
emergency relief, to enable [Hi Tech and
S t o l l e r ]  t o  o b t a i n  a p p r o p r i a te
administrative due process on an expedited
basis pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act.”  
As noted, on June 17, 2003, Hi
Tech requested an administrative hearing
to contest the administrative cease and
desist order.  Thereafter, the Acting Chief
Administrative Law Judge of the State of
New Jersey issued an Initial Decision in
which he accepted Hi Tech’s argument
that it was involved in transportation by
railroad and was, therefore, subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the STB.  State of
New Jersey, Department of Environmental
Protection v. Hi Tech Trans, LLC, OAL
Docket No. ESW 05815-03 (N.J. Office of
Administrative Law Aug. 13, 2003).  The
NJDEP filed exceptions to that Initial
Decision on August 25, 2003.  
In his Final Decision, the
Commiss ione r of  E nviro nm enta l
Protection of the State of New Jersey
reversed the ALJ’s decision and held
instead that Hi Tech’s facility was not
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
STB and that NJDEP’s authority was
therefore not preempted.  Accordingly, Hi
Tech was ordered to immediately cease
and desist its operations at the OIRY.
State of New Jersey, Department of
Environmental Protection v. Hi Tech
Trans, LLC, Final Decision, OAL Docket
No. ESW 05815-03 (September 29,
2003).15
 II.  DISTRICT COURT
PROCEEDINGS
On June 6, 2003, Hi Tech filed the
instant complaint against the NJDEP in
United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey.  Hi Tech sought a
declaration that state laws requiring solid
waste transfer stations like the OIRY to
obtain a solid waste facility permit and a
action of any state administrative agency
or officer and for review of the validity of
any rule promulgated by any state agency
or officer.  See N.J. Court Rule 2:2-
3(a)(2).  
     15  On June 11, 2004, the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey affirmed the Final Decision.   State
o f New  Jerse y,  De partm ent o f
Environmental Protection v. Hi Tech
Trans, LLC, No. A-29-03T3, (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2004) (per curiam).
Hi Tech has filed a Notice of Appeal and
a Notice of Petition for Certification to
Appeal the Appellate Division’s decision
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
8certificate of public convenience and
necessity, are preempted as applied to Hi
Tech.   Based upon its preemption
argument, Hi Tech also sought appropriate
equitable relief including a preliminary
injunction barring NJDEP from enforcing
provisions of state law relevant to
NJDEP’s purported regulatory authority
over Hi Tech and its OIRY based upon Hi
Tech’s claim of preemption.  The NJDEP
responded by arguing that the district court
should abstain, and that the court lacked
jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment.16  The  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t
agreed with Hi Tech’s Eleventh
Amendment argument and dismissed the
complaint, but Hi Tech filed an amended
compliant the same day naming two
individual defendants in their official
c a p a c i t i e s :  B r a d l e y  C a m p b e l l ,
Commissioner of NJDEP, and Wolfgang
Skacel, Director of the Office of Solid &
Hazardous Waste Compliance and
Enforcement of the NJDEP.  The amended
complaint essentially repeated the
allegations of the dismissed complaint.  Hi
Tech’s entire basis for relief was its claim
that its facility is subject to the exclusive
“authority of the Surface Transportation
Board . . . .” App., vol. II, at 30.  Hi Tech
thus requested a declaratory judgment
affirming that its operations are “exempt
from [New Jersey’s] administrative
permitting and licensing regulations[]” and
“that [New Jersey] can take no action to
enforce [its] law against [Hi Tech] . . .
unless that action has been authorized by
the Surface Transportation Board.” Id. at
31.
On June 20, 2003, the district court
dismissed the amended complaint on
grounds of Burford and Younger
abstention, and this appeal followed.17
III. JURISDICTION
Hi Tech contends that we have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1) because the district court’s
dismissal of its amended complaint
pursuant to Younger and Burford
abstention principles amounts to a denial
of its request for preliminary injunctive
relief.  Although we do not agree that we
have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1292(a)(1),
w e  neve r thel e ss  have  appe l l ate
jurisdiction. 
A Burford abstention order is a
final, appealable order under § 1291
because the district court dismisses the
case and consigns it to the state system.
Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 770-771
(3d Cir. 1995).  At one time we suggested
that a Younger abstention order deferring
to state administrative proceedings may
not be a final order if the state
administrative proceeding cannot give the
plaintiff all of the requested relief but
     16 The NJDEP also argued that Hi Tech
failed to make the threshold showing
required as a condition precedent to
preliminary injunctive relief.
     17Hi Tech does not contest the district
court’s holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars its suit against the
NJDEP.  
9federal law can. See Williams v. Red Bank
Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1981),
overruled  on other grounds as recognized
in Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101 (3d Cir.
1989).  However, in Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713
(1996), the Supreme Court concluded that
abstention stay orders are appealable
because they put the “litigants ‘effectively
out of court[.]’ ” The prevailing view now
is “that for all of the abstention doctrines,
a federal court’s decision to abstain is
immediately appealable, but its refusal to
abstain is not appealable until there is a
final judgment.”  Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction, § 12.3 at 768.  
IV.  CONTROLLING  LEGAL
PRINCIPLES.
Hi Tech claims that its solid waste
disposal activities in the OIRY facility are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Surface Transportation Board.  According
to Hi Tech, any state regulation of its
operations at the OIRY facility is therefore
preempted by federal law.  In Hi Tech’s
view, since state law is preempted by the
federal regulatory scheme enforced by the
STB, the district court erred in abstaining,
and should have instead granted the
requested declaratory relief and issued a
preliminary injunction.  Before turning to
the merits of Hi Tech’s preemption
argument, it will be helpful to first discuss
the principles of preemption and
abstention.
A Preemption.
“The Supremacy Clause18 allows
Congress to preempt state legislation if it
so intends.”  Olde Discount Corp. v.
Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted).  How eve r, a
“preemption analysis should be ‘tempered
by the conviction that the proper approach
is to reconcile the operation of both
statutory schemes with one another rather
than holding one completely ousted.’”
Ford  Motor  C o .  v .  In s u r a nce
Commissioner of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 874 F.2d 926, 936 (3d Cir.
1989) (citing Merrill Lynch v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 127 (1973)). 
The Supreme Court has
recognized three general
ways in which federal law
may preempt, and thereby
displace, state law: (1)
‘express preemption,’ which
arises when there is an
explicit statutory command
that state law be displaced;
(2) ‘field preemption,’
which arises when federal
law so thoroughly occupies
a legislative field as to make
reasonable the inference the
Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it;
a n d  ( 3 )  ‘ c o n f l i c t
     18In relevant part, the Supremacy
Clause provides that the “Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuant thereof . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”  U.S.
Const. Art. VI cl.2.  
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preemption,’ which
arises when a state
l a w  m a k e s  i t
impossible to comply
with both state and
federal law or when
the state law stands
as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and
execution of the full
p u r p o s e s  a n d
o b j e c t i v e s  o f
Congress.
The St. Thomas – St. John Hotel and
Tourism Assoc., Inc. v. Gov’t of the United
States Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 237-8
(3d Cir. 2000) (citations and most internal
quotations omitted). Since “[p]reemption
is based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, [it] does indeed
raise a constitutional challenge which
draws the abstention doctrine to the
forefront of our consideration.” Zahl v.
Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2002).
.
B.  Abstention. 
“Abstention is a judicially created
doctrine under which a federal court will
decline to exercise its jurisdiction so that a
state court or agency will have the
opportunity to decide the matters at issue.”
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
791 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted).  The doctrine is rooted
in concerns for the maintenance of the
federal system and “represents an
extraordinary and narrow exception to the
‘virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.’ ” Id. (quoting Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).  Consequently,
abstention is justified “only in the
exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the State court
would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest.”  Id. (citation
omitted).  In other words, “[a]bstention
from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
appropriate only under certain limited
circumstances.”  Chez Sez III Corp. v.
Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 630 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).   Those
circumstances “are loosely gathered under
discrete concepts of abstention named after
leading  Sup reme Cour t  Cases , ”
Chiropractic America v. LaVecchia, 180
F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1999), viz.,
“Pullman” (Railroad Comm’n of Texas v.
Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)); “Burford”
(Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943)); “Younger” (Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37  (1971)); and “Colorado
R ive r”  (C o l o r a d o  R iver  Wate r
Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976)).  As we noted at the
outset, this appeal involves both Burford
and Younger abstention. 
(1).  Burford abstention.
“In Burford, the Supreme Court
stated that a federal court should refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that
would interfere with a state’s efforts to
regulate an area of law in which state
interests predominate and in which
11
adequate and timely state review of the
regulatory scheme is avai lable .”
Chiropractic America v. LaVecchia, 180
F.3d at 104 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. at 332-334).  The purpose of
Burford is to “avoid federal intrusion into
matters of local concern and which are
within the special competence of local
courts.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The
Supreme Court has  “provided a clear
definition of the Burford doctrine.”
Chiropractic America, 180 F.3d at 104.  In
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
the City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), the
Court wrote:
Where timely and adequate
s ta te -cour t  r ev iew i s
available, a federal court
sitting in equity must
decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of
s t a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
agencies:  (1) when there are
"difficult questions of state
law bearing on policy
problems of substantial
pub l ic  i mp o rt  w ho se
importance transcends the
result in the case then at
bar";  or (2) where the
"exercise of federal review
of the question in a case and
in similar cases would be
disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy
with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern.
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)(quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814).
 Burford abstention therefore “calls for a
two-step analysis.”  Riley v. Simmons, 45
F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 1995)(citing New
Orleans Publ. Serv. Inc., at 361).  “The
first question is whether timely and
adequate state law review is available.”
Id. (citation omitted).  “Only if a district
court determines that such review is
available, should it turn to other issues and
determine if the case before it involves
difficult questions of state law impacting
on the state’s public policy or whether the
district court’s exercise of jurisdiction
would have a disruptive effect on the
state’s efforts to establish a coherent
public policy on a matter of important state
concern.”  Id.  
The second prong of the
Burford doctrine, as refined in NOPSI,
requires a court to examine three issues:
“(1) whether the particular regulatory
scheme involves a matter of substantial
public concern; (2) whether it is the sort of
complex technical regulatory scheme to
which the Burford abstention doctrine
usually is applied; and (3) whether federal
review of a party’s claims would interfere
with the state’s efforts to establish and
maintain a coherent regulatory policy.” 
Chiropractic America, 180 F.3d at 105. 
(2).  Younger abstention.
Younger abstention is similar in that
it “espouse[s] a strong federal policy
against federal court interference with
pending state judicial proceedings absent
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extraordinary circumstances.”  Middlesex
County Ethics Commission v. Garden
State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431
(1982).  “The policies underlying Younger
abstention have been frequently reiterated”
by the Court.  Id.  “The notion of comity
includes a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate
way,.” id., (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), as long as they can do so
without contravening the supremacy of
federal law.  “Minimal respect for the state
processes, of course, precludes any
presumption that the state courts will not
safeguard constitutional rights.”  Id.
(emphasis in original).  
In Younger, the district court
enjoined the Los Angeles County District
Attorney from prosecuting the defendant
under a constitutionally-suspect state
statute.  The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the district court’s injunction
was “a violation of the national policy
forbidding federal courts [from] stay[ing]
or enjoin[ing] pending state court
proceedings except under spec ial
circumstances.” 401 U.S. 37, 41.
“Although Younger involved a state court
criminal proceeding, the national policy
against enjoining pending state court
proceedings has since been extended to
noncriminal judicial proceedings.”  Zahl,
282 F.3d at 208 (citation omitted),
including administrative proceedings.
The Court has set out a three-part
test for determining whether Younger
abstention is appropriate: “[a]bstention is
appropriate when: (1) there is a pending
state judicial proceeding;  (2) the
proceeding implicates important state
interests; and (3) the state proceeding
affords an adequate opportunity to raise
constitutional challenges.”
Id., at 209 (citing Garden State, 457 U.S.
at 432). “Even if this test is met, however,
abstention is not appropriate if the plaintiff
e s t a b l i sh e s  t h a t  e x t r a o rd i n a r y
circumstances exist such that deference to
the state proceeding will present a
significant and immediate potential for
irreparable harm to the federal interests
asserted.”  Id., at 210 (citation, ellipses and
internal quotation marks omitted).
V.  DISCUSSION
Hi Tech insists that the district
court erred in abstaining in favor of the
state regulatory process because the court
was confronted with a preemption claim
arising from its rail activity.
A. Hi Tech’s Preemption claim.
In 1995, Congress enacted the
Inters ta te Commerce C om missio n
Termination Act (“ICCTA”), Pub. L. No.
104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) (codified as
amended at various locations in 49 United
States Code), which abolished the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”)
and created the Surface Transportation
Board,  Friends of the Altgen-
Susquehanna Trail, 252 F.2d at 250 n.1, an
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independent agency within the Department
of Transportation.  Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Surface Transportation
Board, 290 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2002).
The ICCTA provides that the STB “would
perform all the functions that previously
were performed by the ICC as of the
effective date of the Act.”  Id. at 525 n.3
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, the STB
“perform[s] the core rail and trucking
responsibilities formerly conducted by the
ICC.”  Peter A. Pfohl, Who Should Pay
For Agency Adjudication?  A Study of
$200,000 Filing Fees at the Surface
Transportation Board, 25 Transp. L. J. 57,
59 (1997).   Under the ICCTA, the STB
has  exc lus ive  ju r isd i c tion  over
“transportation by rail carrier” and its
regulation of rail carriers preempts state
regu lat ion with  respec t to  ra il
transportation.  49 U.S.C. § 10510(b).
The ICCTA defines a “rail carrier”
as a “person providing common carrier
railroad transportation for compensation.”
49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).   There are formal
procedures that must be followed to obtain
the STB’s authorization to act as a rail
carrier.  See 49 U.S.C. § 10910.  This
record establishes that Hi Tech has never
received such formal certification from the
STB.  The district court notes that “on July
3, 2000, Hi Tech filed a Notice of
Exemption in accordance with 49 C.F.R. §
1150.32 in an attempt to ‘commence
common carrier rail service over 641 miles
of Canadian Pacific rail track, [but] Hi
Tech withdrew its Notice of Exemption on
July 17, 2000, and has never obtained
status as a rail carrier.” App., vol. I, at 10
n.7.  Hi Tech has not offered anything to
demonstrate that the court’s conclusion
that Hi Tech “never obtained status as a
rail carrier” is erroneous.    Indeed, in a
related case, the district court held that Hi
Tech is not a “rail carrier” within the
meaning of the ICCTA. Hi Tech Trans,
LLC v. Hudson County Improvement
Authority, No. 02-3781, slip op. at 2-3
(D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2003).   Given the nature of
its loading activities, that holding is not
surprising. 
Hi Tech nevertheless claims that it
is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the STB because its facility falls under the
ICCTA’s definitions of “transportation”
and “railroad.” In Hi Tech’s view, because
it falls under both definitions, its facility is
subject to the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction
and, therefore, New Jersey’s SWMA and
its implementing regulations are
preempted as applied to it.  It submits:
Hi Tech operates a
“railroad” insofar as it
o p e r a t e s  i n t e r m o d a l
equipment used by or in
connection with a railroad
and operates a terminal
facility and yard and ground
used for transportation.  Hi
T e c h  p r o v i d e s
“transportation” insofar as it
provides a yard, property,
facility and equipment
related to the movement of
property by rail and services
relating to that movement.
When taken together, Hi
Tech’s facility and activity
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fall directly within
the definitions set
forth in the ICCTA
and the regulations
thereof by state and
local authorities is
expressly preempted.
Thus, the STB, by
virtue of its exclusive
jur isd iction  over
transportation by rail
c a r r i e r s ,  h a s
exclusive jurisdiction
over Hi Tech and its
regulation preempts
state law.
Hi Tech’s Br. at 18-19.
B. The Relationship Between
Abstention and Preemption Here.
We are, of course, mindful that
there is no absolute rule prohibiting
abstention whenever a preemption claim is
asserted.  See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 874
F.2d at 934; Kentucy West Virginia Gas
Co., 791 F.2d at 1117.  In NOPSI, the
Court stated, “[I]t is clear that the mere
assertion of a substantial constitutional
challenge to state action will not alone
compel the exerc ise of fed eral
jurisdiction.” 491 U.S. at 365.  That
statement was, however, not part of the
holding in NOPSI as the Court relied on
the fact that the state proceeding at issue
there was not the kind of proceeding that
can trigger abstention under Younger.  See,
id., at 367.  Nevertheless, this dicta in
NOPSI has often guided courts in deciding
whether to abstain from resolving issues of
preemption. For example, in Olde
Discount Corp., we stated “a claim of
federal preemption, in and of itself, is not
entitled to more deferential treatment than
other constitutional claims in the face of an
abstention challenge.”  1 F.3d at 214.   
There, the district court enjoined
the Delaware Securities Commissioner
from seeking recission on behalf of
investors who had signed an arbitration
agreement before the dispute arose.  We
had to address a question of preemption as
Olde  Discount arg ued th at the
congressional policy favoring arbitration
underlying the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) preempted the Commissioner’s
right of recission under Delaware Law.
The case therefore presented “a novel
question of the relationship between a
contracting party’s right to enforcement of
an arbitration agreement under the [FAA]
and a state’s interest in pursuing a remedy
of rescission in an administrative
proceeding.” 1 F.3d at 204.  We affirmed
the district court’s injunction and rejected
Olde Discount’s contention that the district
court should have abstained in favor of the
proceedings in state court. In doing so, we
focused on the centrality of the preemption
claim stating, “[i]ndeed, the circumstances
presented make clear that a nonfrivolous
claim of FAA preemption of a state
remedy necessarily presents an exception
to the Younger doctrine.” Id., at 211.   We
reasoned that “abstention in this case
would be difficult to justify in light of the
congressional intent reflected in [the
FAA].” Id., at 21.
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Thereafter, in resolving the tension
between preemption and abstention in
Chiropractic America, we stated,  “[o]ur
focus should not be on whether a federal
claim has been presented, but rather on the
nature of that claim.”  180 F.3d at 108
(emphasis in original).  We added that
“[c]ourts have held almost uniformly, for
example, that abstention is inappropriate
when a federal plaintiff asserts a
preemption/Supremacy Clause claim.”  Id.;
see also Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co.,
791 F.2d at 1115-16; Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Int’l Local 54 v.
Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 832 (3d Cir.
1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S.
491 (1984).  
Similarly, in Ford Motor Co., we
addressed the propriety of abstention when
balancing “the federal scheme designed to
assist the nation’s failing savings and loan
companies and the important state interest
in regulating the state insurance industry.”
874 F.2d at 928.  We there held that, given
the pervasive federal regulation of
banking, abstention in favor of state law
was inappropriate.  In doing so, we
approvingly quoted the district court as
follows: “‘ dispositive [of the issue] is a
line of cases from the Courts of Appeals
for the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits that hold that there can be no
important state interests that the federal
court should defer to in enforcing a state
law that has been preempted by federal
law.’” 874 F.2d at 988. (Emphasis added)
(quoting Ford Motor Co., v. Insurance
Commissioner of Pennsylvania, 672 F.
Supp. 841, 849-50 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). 
As Olde Discount and Ford Motor
Co. illustrate, abstention is usually
inappropriate in such a case because
“Supremacy Clause claims are essentially
ones of federal policy, so that the federal
courts are particularly appropriate bodies
for the application of preemption
principles.” Chiropractic America, 180
F.3d at 108. Moreover, where the federal
interest is so strong that it preempts state
law, there will rarely be a state interest
sufficient to justify a federal court’s
decision to abstain from its “unflagging
obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction. See
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976)).
This follows because “[a]bstention
is predicated solely upon the significance
of the federal interest invoked.”  Zahl, 282
F.3d at 210 (citation and internal
quotations omitted).  Therefore, “[w]here
‘Congress has created a statutory scheme
. . . which arguably preempts the local
regulation complained of, a fundamental
element of Burford abstention is thrown
into doubt, for we must question whether
the case indeed involves an essentially
local issue.” Kentucky West Va. Gas Co.,
791 F.2d at 1116. Moreover, abstention
under Younger can afford the Supremacy
Clause no less priority.  
Claims of federal preemption thus
“require[]  review of the state interest to be
served by abstention, in tandem with the
federal interest that is asserted to have
usurped the state law.”  Ford Motor Co.,
874 F.2d at 934. The “notion of comity, so
central to the abstention doctrine, is not
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strained when a federal court cuts off state
proceedings that encroach upon the federal
domain.”  Zahl, 282 F.3d at 210 (citation
and internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, 
[t]he determination of
whether abstention is proper
where preemption is alleged
does not rest upon whether
the preemption claim will
u l t i m a t e l y  p r e v a i l .
Accordingly, just as the
presence of a claim of
p r e e m p t i o n  w i l l  n o t
preclude abstention in every
case, the decision that
abstention is improper in
light of  a  c la im of
preemption that has been
asserted, need not result in
the finding that the state
statute has in fact been
preempted.
Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 935 n.12.  
Hi Tech’s claim is bottomed upon,
and limited to, its assertion that its
operations at the OIRY facility implicate
the STB’s authority over railroads.  Hi
Tech contends that this is therefore a case
of express preemption given the statutory
definitions of “transportation” and
“railroad” contained in the ICCTA.   Since
the Surface Transportation Board has
exc lus ive  jur isd ic tion ove r  r a il
transportation, Friends of the Atglen-
Susquehanna Trail, 252 F.3d at 250 n.1,
Hi Tech insists that there is no local
interest justifying federal abstention.
As noted earlier, Hi Tech claims
that it is subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the STB even though it is
not certified as a “railcarrier” because its
facility falls under the ICCTA’s definitions
of “transportation” and “railroad.
“ [ T ]ransp or ta t io n ”  i s
defined, under the ICCTA,
inter alia , as a 
yard, property, facility,
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ,  o r
equipment of any kind
related to the movement of
passengers or property, or
both, by rail, regardless of
ownership or an agreement
concerning use; and . . .
services related to that
m o v e m e n t ,  i n c l u d i n g
receipt, delivery, transfer in
transit, refrigeration, icing,
v e n t i l a t i o n ,  s t o r a g e ,
handling, and interchange of
passengers and property. . .
.” 
49 U.S.C. §§ 10102(9)(A), (B).  Under the
ICCTA, a “railroad” is, inter alia,
“intermodal equipment used by or in
connection with a railroad” and a
“terminal facility, and a freight depot,
yard, and ground, used or necessary for
transportation.”  49 U.S.C. §§
10102(6)(A), (c).     
Even if we assume arguendo that
Hi Tech’s facility falls within the statutory
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definition of “transportation” and/or
“railroad,” the facility still satisfies only a
part of the equation.  The STB has
exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation
by rail carrier.”  49 U.S.C. § 10510(a), (b)
(emphasis added).   However, the most
cursory analysis of Hi Tech’s operations
reveals that its facility does not involve
“transportation by rail carrier.”  The most
it involves is transportation “to rail
carrier.” Trucks bring C&D debris from
construction sites to Hi Tech’s facility
where the debris is dumped into Hi Tech’s
hoppers.  Hi Tech then  “transloads,” the
C&D debris from its hoppers into rail cars
owned and operated by CPR, the railroad.
It is CPR that then transports the C&D
debris “by rail” to out of state disposal
facilities.   As we noted above, Hi Tech
operates its facility under a License
Agreement with CPR.  Pursuant to the
terms of that license agreement, Hi Tech is
permitted to use a portion of CPR’s OIRY
for transloading.  Hi Tech is responsible
for constructing and maintaining the
facility and CPR disclaims any liability for
Hi Tech’s operations.   License
Agreement, ¶¶ 4(d), 7.   Thus, the License
Agreement essentially eliminates CPR’s
involvement in, and responsibility for, the
operation of Hi Tech’s facility.  Hi Tech
does not claim that there is any agency or
employment relationship between it and
CPR or that CPR sets or charges a fee to
those who bring C&D debris to Hi Tech’s
transloading facility.19   
Accordingly, it is clear that Hi Tech
simply uses CPR’s property to load C&D
debris into/onto CPR’s railcars.  The mere
fact that the CPR ultimately uses rail cars
to transport the C&D debris Hi Tech loads
does not morph Hi Tech’s activities into
“transportation by rail carrier.”  Indeed, if
Hi Tech’s reasoning is accepted, any
nonrail carrier’s operations would come
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB
if, at some point in a chain of distribution,
it handles products that are eventually
shipped by rail by a railcarrier.   The
district court could not accept the
argument that Congress intended the
exclusive jurisdiction of the STB to sweep
that broadly, and neither can we. 
However, as we noted at the outset,
the district court stated that it was
abstaining under Burford and Younger,
and announced that it would therefore not
decide Hi Tech’s action for declaratory
relief.  Nevertheless, it is clear from its
amended complaint that Hi Tech sought
only a declaration that it is exempt from
state regulations relating to its “intermodal
rail operations.” App., vol. II, at 194.  Hi
Tech included a request for “[s]uch other
relief as this Court deems just and
equitable.” Id. at 194.  However, that was
clearly just an attempt to allow for a
remedy if it prevailed on its preemption
claim. It does not alter the fact that the
     19 We do not cite the License
Agreement to suggest that a party can
contractually determine its status as a
railroad carrier for regulatory purposes.
Rather, we cite it merely  because it further
reflects the nature of Hi Tech’s activities
and its relationship to CPR.  
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only issue before the district court was
whether New Jersey’s environmental
regulations were preempted because Hi
Tech’s facility is subject only to regulation
by the STB.  The district court responded
to Hi Tech’s request by concluding in
relevant part:
While the federal interest in
r e g u l a t in g  i n t e r s t a t e
railroads is indeed strong,
the federal interest in this
case is vitiated at least in
part by the unprecedented
claim of Hi Tech to be
treated as a “railroad,” when
it is in fact a solid waste
transfer station operating
pursuant to a license from a
railroad.
App., vol. I, at 10 n.7.  The court held that
since New Jersey’s interest in regulating
its solid waste disposal facilities is as real
as it is critical, and since Hi Tech’s
claimed federal interest in regulating
railroads was virtually non-existent given
Hi Tech’s business, Hi Tech’s preemption
claim was meritless. The district court
explained:
[b]alancing [Hi Tech’s]
rather attenuated federal
interest against the interests
of the State of New Jersey,
there is a well-recognized
compelling state interest in
the DEP’s enforcement of
its own environmental laws
especially as to the uniquely
vexing problem of solid
waste facilities in a densely
populated state that has
suffered the scourge of
unregulated solid waste
facilities for decades.20
     20On June 17, 2003, eleven days after
Hi Tech filed its first complaint in the
district court, Hi Tech filed a petition with
the STB. It relied upon substantially the
same preemption arguments we reject here
and requested a declaratory order that its
facility is therefore not subject to
regulation by  New Jersey’s SWMA and
its implementing regulations.
In a decision of the Director of the
Office of Proceedings of the STB, dated
August 14, 2003, Hi Tech’s argument was
rejected.  Hi Tech Trans, LLC – Petition
for Declaratory Order, 2003 WL
21952136, STB Finance Docket No.
34192 (Sub. -No. 1).  After discussion and
analysis, the STB concluded:
In sum, Hi Tech’s activities
at its transloading facility at
CP’s Oak Island Yard and
related activities are not part
of “transportation by rail
carrier” as defined under 49
U.S.C. § 10501(a).  Hi Tech
is merely using CP’s
property to transload cargo.
Thus, the Board does not
have jurisdiction over those
activities, and section
10501(b) preemption does
not apply to the state and
local regulations at issue
19
Id.   We agree. In fact, the district court’s
balance of the federal and state interests is
as compelling as it is poignant.  However,
that’s the jurisprudential “rub.” For we are
at a loss to understand why the court went
on to state in the very same paragraph of
its Order:  “upon balancing the state and
federal interests in this case, . . . this Court
will abstain from entertaining [Hi Tech’s]
Amended Complaint and will exercise its
discretion not to grant the declaratory
relief sought by Hi Tech.” Id.   As noted
above, Hi Tech only asked the court to
d e c l a r e  w h e t h e r  N e w  J e r s e y’s
environmental regulations were preempted
by federal law. Although the amended
complaint also asked for “such other relief
as [the] Court deems just and equitable,” it
is clear that the Court concluded as a
matter of law that injunctive relief was
neither just nor equitable because it
correctly rejected Hi Tech’s claim of a
preempting federal interest.  Thus, there
was nothing left for the district court to
abstain from.21 The court gave Hi Tech all
it asked for; a declaration of whether
federal law preempted state environmental
regulation of the OIRY.  “Once a
judgment disposing of all issues on which
the parties sought a declaration is entered
by a court,” the matter is at an end.
Henglein v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp., 260 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). 
here.  Therefore, Hi
Tech’s petition to
institute a declaratory
order proceeding will
be denied.
2003 WL 21952136 at *5.  
For reasons best known to counsel
for Hi Tech, Hi Tech never saw fit to
inform us of the declaratory proceeding it
instituted before the STB or the Board’s
decision.  The NJDEP referred to it in its
brief, at 14, but we did not learn about the
Director’s August 14, 2003, decision until
counsel for the NJDEP sent a letter
pursuant to F.R.A.P. 28(j) on August 27,
2003.
Hi Tech filed an appeal of the
Director’s decision, but on June 18, 2004,
Hi Tech filed a letter with the STB
withdrawing that appeal.  Counsel for Hi
Tech similarly did not see did not see fit to
inform this court of its decision to
withdraw its appeal, and we also learned
of it only in a “28(j)” letter that counsel for
NJDEP sent on July 19, 2004.  We do not
know why counsel for Hi Tech thought it
appropriate to refrain from informing this
court of matters so germane to this appeal,
but we are certainly troubled by the level
of professionalism and apparent lack of
candor it reflects.
     21 Indeed, even Judge Smith is forced to
examine the strength of the federal interest
here in explaining why abstention was
proper.  In his opinion, Judge Smith,
agrees that the comparative weight of the
federal interest here does not support a
finding of preemption.  Nevertheless, he
concludes that the district court should
have abstained even though, given the
required preemption analysis, there was
nothing left to abstain from. 
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Therefore, although the district court
correctly dismissed the amended
complaint, it did so for the wrong reason.
It should not have relied on concepts of
abstention; it didn’t actually abstain.
Rather, it should have dismissed the
amended complaint because there was no
basis for relief given Hi Tech’s
“untenable” and  meritless preemption
claim.
CONCLUSION
 Accordingly, for the reasons set
forth above, we will affirm the order of the
district court insofar as it rejected Hi
Tech’s preemption claim and dismissed Hi
Tech’s amended complaint.
                          
SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the
judgment:
I agree with the majority that the
District Court should have dismissed Hi
Tech’s complaint.  I disagree, however,
with the majority’s conclusion that the
complaint should have been dismissed on
the merits rather than on abstention
grounds.  In my view, the District Court
properly abstained from reaching the
merits of this case under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The majority recognizes that this
case satisfies the three-part test for
abstention under the doctrine of Younger.
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).22  And the majority does not
i d e n t i f y  a n y  “ ‘ e x t r a o r d i n a r y
circumstances’” by which “‘deference to
the state proceeding will present a
significant and immediate potential for
irreparable harm to the federal interests
asserted.’”  Zahl, 282 F.3d at 209
(emphasis added) (quoting Schall v. Joyce,
     22  First, there was a pending
administrative enforcement proceeding
before the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, for which New
Jersey law provides Hi Tech with a right to
a hearing and a right to judicial review.
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:14B-1 to 52:14B-24;
Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding that similar proceedings
under the New Jersey Administrative
Procedure Act “are clearly judicial in
nature, and therefore meet the first part of
the [Younger] test”).  Second, “there is a
well-recognized compelling state interest
in the [NJDEP’s] enforcement of its own
environmental laws especially as to the
uniquely vexing problem of solid waste
facilities in a densely populated state that
has suffered the scourge of unregulated
solid waste facilities for decades.”  Slip
Op. at 30 (quoting App. at 10).  Third,
there was an adequate opportunity to
address Hi Tech’s preemption argument in
the state proceedings.  Indeed, preemption
appears to have been the only issue raised
in the state proceedings.  What is more, the
New Jersey ALJ ruled in favor of Hi Tech
on its preemption argument.  NJDEP v. Hi
Tech Trans, LLC, OAL Dkt. No. ESW
05815-03 (N.J. Office of Administrative
Law Aug. 13, 2003).
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885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)); accord
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53 (abstention may
not be appropriate under “extraordinary
circumstances” where “irreparable injury”
would result).23
Nevertheless, the m ajority
concludes that the District Court should
have resolved Hi Tech’s declaratory
judgment action on the merits, despite an
ongoing state proceeding that was more
than capable of addressing Hi Tech’s
     23  In my view, the majority overstates
the significance that the presence of a
preemption claim should have on a federal
court’s decision whether to abstain under
Younger.  The Supreme Court has
addressed this relationship in no uncertain
terms: 
There is no greater federal
interest in enforcing the
supremacy of  federal
statutes than in enforcing 
the supremacy of explicit
constitutional guarantees,
a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
challenges to state action, no
less than pre-emption-based
cha l l enges ,  c a l l  i n to
question the legitimacy of
the State’s interest in its
proceedings reviewing or
enforcing that action.  Yet it
is clear that the mere
assertion of a substantial
constitutional challenge to
state action will not alone
compel the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
the City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491
U.S. 350, 365 (1989).  The majority
characterizes this passage as dicta—a
characterization with which I disagree and
which is unnecessary to the majority’s
disposition of this case—and discusses
opinions from this Court that either pre-
date NOPSI or that involved abstention
under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943), rather than Younger.
To be sure, cases involving
preemption under the Supremacy Clause
may present a significant and immediate
threat of irreparable harm to federal
interests such that abstention under
Younger is inappropriate.  E.g., Olde
Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202,
212-13 (3d Cir. 1993) (Younger abstention
not appropriate where state proceeding
presented “an immediate potential for
irreparable harm” to party’s right to
arbitration under Federal Arbitration Act).
Were Hi Tech’s  claim “facially
conclusive,” for example, the threat of
irreparable harm might be significant and
immediate.  NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366
(suggesting that “[i]rreparable injury may
possibly be established . . . by a showing
that the challenged state statute is
‘flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions.’”
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54)).
But that is certainly not the case here, as
the majority concludes that Hi Tech’s
claims are without merit.
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preemption claim.  In my view, it is
precisely this sort of “federal interference
with pending state judicial proceedings”
that Younger abstention is designed to
avoid.  Slip Op. at 19 (quoting Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. at 431).  
“The notion of ‘comity’
includes ‘a proper respect
for state functions , a
recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made
up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a
continuance of the belief
t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l
Government will fare best if
the S ta tes and the ir
institutions are left free to
perform their separate
functions in their separate
ways.’” 
Slip Op. at 19 (quoting Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. at 431 (quoting Younger,
401 U.S. at 44)).
Although Younger involved an
action to enjoin an ongoing state
proceeding, the companion case of
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74
(1971), concluded that the same comity
and federalism principles preclude federal
courts from reaching the merits of a
declaratory judgment action.  See Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. at 431 n.10.  The
majority today reaches precisely the
opposite conclusion as that which I believe
is required by Samuels.  In Samuels, the
district court dismissed the declaratory
judgment action on the merits, holding that
the challenged s ta te  laws were
constitutional.  401 U.S. at 67-68, 73.  The
Supreme Court “affirm[ed] the judgment
dismissing the complaint, but solely on the
ground that, in the appropriate exercise of
the court’s discretion, relief by way of
declaratory judgment should have been
denied without consideration of the
merits.”  Id. at 73.  Consistent with
Samuels, the District Court in this case
dismissed Hi Tech’s complaint, declining
to issue a judgment on the merits of Hi
Tech’s preemption claim despite the
court’s express doubts regarding the
preemption issue.  The majority affirms,
but, contrary to Samuels, affirms on the
ground that Hi Tech’s complaint should
have been dismissed on the merits.  The
m a j o r i t y  r e a c h e s  th e  c o r r e c t
result—affirmance of the District
Court—but on grounds that, in my
opinion, are contrary to Supreme Court
precedent. 
The difficulty in this case is that Hi
Tech’s preemption claim is translucently
thin.  Reading the majority’s analysis of
that claim, I have every confidence that
their treatment of the preemption issue is
correct.  My confidence is bolstered by the
fact that both the NJDEP and the Superior
Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
came to the same conclusion.  New Jersey
v. Hi Tech Trans., LLC, No. A-929-03T3
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 11, 2004);
New Jersey v. Hi Tech Trans., LLC, No.
SWE PEA030001-U131 (NJDEP Sept. 29,
2003).  In my view, however, these
observations simply reinforce the basic
premise of Younger:  “Minimal respect for
the state processes, of course, precludes
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any presumption that the state courts will
not safeguard federal constitutional
rights.”  Slip Op. at 19 (quoting Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. at 431).  
The dispute in this case is a dispute
between the NJDEP and Hi Tech,
commenced in a state administrative
tribunal with judicial review in the state
courts.  These proceedings were ongoing
at the time Hi Tech filed its complaint in
federal court, and there is no question that
these proceedings were and continue to be
capable of resolving the preemption issue
raised by Hi Tech.  Due regard for the state
institutions involved in this dispute
required the District Court to decline Hi
Tech’s invitation to consider a declaratory
judgment that would obviate the
substantial time and effort that New Jersey
has expended on these matters.  Because
the majority’s reasoning suggests the
opposite, I am constrained to concur only
in the judgment.
          
     
